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INTRODUCTION 
It could have been the case that declared “most of 
Government . . . unconstitutional,” by reviving a robust application of the doctrine 
that prohibits Congress from delegating its law-making power to the other 
branches.1  At least that is what many awaiting the Court’s widely-anticipated 2019 
decision in Gundy v. United States believed, after the Court agreed to hear Gundy’s 
claim that “Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it 
authorized the Attorney General to ‘specify the applicability’ of [the federal Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act]’s registration requirements to pre-Act 
offenders.”2  This includes, no doubt, the editors of this journal, when they chose 
Gundy (before the decision) as the subject of the yearly “Term Paper” on a 
significant Supreme Court case.  
In the end, Gundy said little new about the nondelegation doctrine.  This essay 
follows the Court’s lead and says little about nondelegation.  Instead, it considers 
another, equally significant aspect of the interpretation of sex offender registration 
acts (SORAs): whether they, and other similar laws and regulations that purport to 
be civil nonpunitive approaches to regulating behavior and protecting the public, 
instead actually impose punishment and should be characterized as criminal rather 
than civil.  This characterization is significant, because a number of constitutional 
protections—including the right to counsel, to a jury trial where the burden of proof 
is beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the privilege against self-incrimination—are 
mandated in criminal cases.3  Thus, while many consequences related to criminal 
convictions might appear and feel quite punitive in nature, this essay focuses on the 
more binary (although, as explored below, not neatly divided) doctrinal 
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1   Gundy v. United States, No. 17-6086, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 20, 2019).  The nondelegation 
doctrine derives from Article I, §1 of the Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, and “is rooted 
in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government.” Mistretta 
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
2   Gundy, slip op. at 4. 
3   U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963). 
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determination that a particular consequence is a criminal punishment rather than a 
civil consequence.4  In addition to SORAs, there are a large and growing number of 
so-called collateral consequences of criminal convictions. These include quite 
drastic consequences, such as deportation, loss of public housing and financial aid, 
and barriers to occupational licensing and employment, that often overshadow any 
direct sanction imposed in the criminal case.5  Although some of these consequences 
are directly based on or closely linked to an underlying criminal conviction, courts 
have frequently characterized them as nonpunitive and thus civil under existing 
doctrinal tests.6 
But things are starting to change.  There is recent research about whether 
particular consequences actually advance—or instead undercut—the purportedly 
nonpunitive public safety rationales upon which so many of them rest.  There are 
also advances in technology and the delivery of information about criminal records 
that render an individual’s experience of the “collateral” consequences of a criminal 
conviction altogether different, and harsher, than previously.  Drawing on these and 
other changing realities, some courts have recently placed more consequences on 
the criminal side of the line.7 
Although reassessment of the civil-criminal line is already happening in the 
lower courts, this issue could also resurface in a future nondelegation case—and 
nondelegation is something the Supreme Court may well revisit soon.  Thus, a brief 
word on Gundy and then on its connection to the civil-criminal line.  In Gundy, the 
four-Justice plurality took a somewhat tortured view of the meaning of Congress’ 
words in the federal SORNA section that delegated “the authority to specify the 
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter [of SORNA] to sex offenders 
convicted before the enactment of this chapter” to the Attorney General.8  Finding 
that the law’s “text, considered alongside its context, purpose, and history,” gave the 
Attorney General discretion to determine only how and when (but not whether) it 
would be feasible to apply SORNA to those convicted before the act was effective, 
the plurality held that Congress also provided appropriate guidance for the exercise 
of that discretion and thus did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.9  The Gundy 
plurality did not disturb nondelegation doctrine as set out in cases from the 1930s. 
                                                                                                                            
4   This essay uses the terms civil-criminal and nonpunitive-punitive interchangeably, and in 
reference to the doctrinal line that separates civil nonpunitive consequences from criminal punitive 
ones (while recognizing that many purportedly nonpunitive consequences look and feel punitive).  The 
distinction between collateral and direct consequences is another relevant doctrinal line, similar to the 
civil-criminal line. 
5   See infra notes 34–35, and accompanying text. 
6   See infra notes 26–33. 
7   See infra Parts II, III. 
8   34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2006). 
9   Gundy, slip op. at 6.  
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Herman Gundy lost and “most of Government” survived, with only eight Justices 
taking part in the decision and a reluctant concurrence by Justice Alito.10  However, 
a full Court may soon return to the issue of nondelegation given Justice Alito’s open 
invitation to do so in his Gundy concurrence and a widely-predicted fifth vote from 
Justice Kavanaugh to reconsider the current approach.11 
Should that happen, one choice the Court may confront is whether it should 
treat delegation in the criminal law context differently from delegation in the civil 
law context.  This picks up on a suggestion in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in United 
States v. Nichols, written shortly before he joined the Supreme Court, that courts 
might use a particular—and particularly demanding—nondelegation test “when the 
criminal law is involved.”12  Although it is far from clear how and when the Court 
might approach a future nondelegation case, a rule specific to criminal laws makes 
good sense, as Wayne Logan has suggested in another term paper in this volume and 
in prior writings, given the liberty interests involved and relative lack of technical 
complexities in criminal law.13  As Logan also notes, such an approach might force 
the Court to address long-standing and challenging issues about the line between 
civil and criminal sanctions.14 
That brings things back to this essay saying little about nondelegation.  Separate 
and apart from a delegation doctrine specific to criminal law, today—or in the near 
future—how might the Court distinguish between a civil (nonpunitive) and criminal 
(punitive) statute or regulation?  Although the Court has answered that question 
before, it has done so in different ways and varying contexts.  There is reason to 
expect that the Court might approach things differently (more coherently?) yet again.  
In addition to much-needed clarity in the “conceptually muddled” body of doctrine 
about the line between punitive and nonpunitive consequences that lower courts 
grapple with in different contexts,15 reassessment of where consequences belong on 
the civil-criminal line is particularly timely.  A rapidly increasing number and 
                                                                                                                            
10  Gundy, slip op. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[B]ecause a majority is not willing to [reconsider 
its approach to the nondelegation doctrine], it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue 
here for special treatment.”).   
11  Gundy, slip op. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to 
reconsider the approach [to nondelegation] we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that 
effort.”); see also Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Supreme Court is One Vote Away from Changing How the 
U.S. is Governed, THE NEW YORKER (July 3, 2019) https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/the-supreme-court-is-one-vote-away-from-changing-how-the-us-is-governed.  
12  United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir. 2015).   
13  Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 115 n.367 (2008). 
14  Wayne A. Logan, Gundy v. United States: Gunning for the Administrative State, 17 Ohio St. 
J. Crim. L. 185 (2019). 
15  Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 781 (1997).   
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variety of actors use criminal records in a broad range of decision-making functions, 
sometimes mandated by state or federal law or regulation.  That increase is 
intertwined with easily-accessible public criminal records as well as a booming 
background screening industry, putting such information just a few free, or relatively 
inexpensive, keystrokes away for those actors.16 
The remainder of this essay puts Gundy to the side and considers the line 
between civil (nonpunitive) and criminal (punitive) consequences.  Part I describes 
how the civil-criminal divide arises in a number of important contexts, with a focus 
on considerations set out in ex post facto doctrine.  Part II discusses several Supreme 
Court cases that hint at a growing recognition of shifting realities that might, in turn, 
shift outcomes at the civil-criminal dividing line.  Finally, Part III flags several of 
the most significant changed realities and briefly discusses how courts might 
integrate, and in some cases already have integrated, these new realities when 
determining if a consequence is civil or criminal.  
 
I. THE CURRENT DOCTRINAL LINE(S) BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
The division of consequences into “civil” and “criminal” categories, with an 
array of constitutional protections applicable only on the criminal side of the divide, 
suggests a firm binary.  However, that dividing line is far from clear.  As Carol 
Steiker has observed, judicial attempts to “to identify ‘punishment’ so as to make 
our two-track procedural system work . . . ha[ve] been conceptually muddled, to say 
the least.”17  The result is a patchwork of approaches that depends on the context of 
the case.  For example, in cases challenging various state and federal sex offender 
registration and notification provisions, courts have considered the civil-criminal 
line under the Ex Post Facto Clause18 and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.19  Civil forfeiture has withstood challenge 
and been deemed nonpunitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause.20  In a growing 
body of caselaw related to consequences ranging from deportation to loss of pension 
                                                                                                                            
16  See infra notes 33–37, and accompanying text. 
17  Steiker, supra note 15, at 781. Cf. id. at 814 (“[T]he justifications for a criminal-civil divide 
as I have construed them suggest that we should strive for a binary system rather than a middleground—
even if that seems harsh (to either the state or the defendant) in borderline cases.”); Joshua Kaiser, We 
Know It When We See It: The Tenous Line Between “Direct Punishment” and “Collateral 
Consequences,” 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 366 (2016) (“Padilla v. Kentucky shattered any semblance of clarity 
in the direct-collateral distinction, and lower courts are still reeling.”).  
18  See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370–71 
(1997) (challenges by individuals convicted before the effective date of the relevant SORNA). 
19  Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1223 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-1333 
(10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017).    
20  United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270–71 (1996). 
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benefits, courts have confronted the civil-criminal divide in ruling on individuals’ 
claims that their lawyers’ failure to advise them about that particular consequence 
of their conviction or to plea bargain to avoid its imposition violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.21  Related cases examine judicial failure to advise a 
defendant about a consequence of a guilty plea as a potential due process violation.22 
These many doctrinal tests that courts employ to grapple with the line between 
a civil and criminal consequence, as well as the robust scholarly debate about how 
to define “punishment,”23 are beyond the scope of this brief essay.  Suffice it to say 
that, had the Gundy Court fashioned a specific test for criminal law delegation, it 
likely would have used an Ex Post Facto Clause analysis to confront the threshold 
determination of whether the federal SORNA consequence at issue in that case was 
criminal (punitive) or rather civil (nonpunitive).24  Although the Court has not 
examined the federal SORNA for these purposes, it undertook such an analysis of 
Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) in Smith v. Doe, and did so under 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Further, the considerations in that analysis are relevant to 
other, non-Ex Post Facto Clause cases involving the civil-criminal line.25  
                                                                                                                            
21  See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & WAYNE A. LOGAN, 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION: LAW POLICY & PRACTICE 251–306 (2018–19 
ed.) (examining the scope of the Sixth Amendment obligations of counsel before and after Padilla); 
see also Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2656–68 (2013).  
22  LOVE, ROBERTS & LOGAN, supra note 21, at 299–304. 
23  See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 15, at 799 (describing the need to define “punishment” to 
“explain what it is about the distinguishing features of punishment that calls for a special procedural 
regime (whatever the contingent particulars of that regime may be).”); see also Brian M. Murray, Are 
Collateral Consequences Deserved, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2019) (manuscript at 
n.4). (“[E]ven if collateral consequences are not criminal punishment by classification, they can still 
be punitive.”). 
24  In Gundy itself, this would not have been a difficult question, as Gundy was challenging his 
conviction under a portion of the federal SORNA that allowed for a 10-year prison sentence for failure 
to register.  Gundy, slip op. at 4–5 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Although Justice Gorsuch did not focus on 
a specific criminal nondelegation test in his Gundy dissent, he began that dissent by pointing out how 
the SORNA delegation at issue “purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to 
write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens” and how SORNA was a 
“law[] restricting the liberty of this group[.]”  Id. at 1 (describing SORNA as a “criminal code” three 
times in dissenting). 
25  See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (“Our conclusion that the [Sexually 
Violent Predator] Act is nonpunitive thus removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double 
jeopardy and ex post facto claims.”); Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1226 (D. Colo. 2017), 
appeal filed, No. 17-1333 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017) (applying seven factors from Supreme Court’s ex 
post facto test for punitive “effect” in Eighth Amendment analysis); see also Steiker, supra note 15, at 
819 (“Recall that Mendoza-Martinez, listed seven ‘factors’ as generally applicable to determinations 
of whether putatively civil proceedings are really criminal for all purposes.”); David Singleton, What 
is Punishment?: The Case for Considering Public Opinion Under Mendoza-Martinez, 45 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 435, 439 (2015) (stating that the Mendoza-Martinez, “framework has been used in a variety of 
contexts to determine whether statutory sanctions impose punishment”).  
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In 2003 in Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled that Alaska’s SORA was “a 
civil, nonpunitive regime.”26  As such, its application to individuals convicted before 
its effective date did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.27  To arrive at this 
conclusion, the Court applied a two-part test.  First, courts must ask whether the 
legislature intended the law to be punitive.28  If so, it would be a criminal law that 
could not be applied retroactively (and to which all other relevant procedures for 
criminal cases would presumably apply, although those were not at issue in Smith).29  
If the legislature instead intended to “enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and 
nonpunitive,” courts must proceed to the second part of the test and ask whether—
by the “clearest proof”—“the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.”30  For this “in effect” prong, 
courts can refer to the seven factors drawn from its earlier decision, Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, as non-exclusive and non-dispositive “guideposts.”31  These 
factors ask whether, “in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme”32: “involves 
an affirmative disability or restraint”; “has historically been regarded as a 
punishment”; “comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; operates to “promote 
the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence”; applies to behavior 
that “is already a crime”; is rationally connected to “an alternative purpose” other 
than punishment; and “appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned.”33  In Smith, the Court found nonpunitive intent and nonpunitive effect. 
                                                                                                                            
26  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2002).  There are two ex post facto clauses in the Constitution.  
U.S. CONST. ART. 1, §§ 9–10.  Art. 1, § 9 prohibits Congress from passing any laws which apply ex post 
facto, while Art. 1 § 10 (the relevant provision in Smith) applies to state passage of any such laws.  Id. 
27  Smith, 538 U.S. at 105.  
28  Id. at 92.    
29  Id.   
30  Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (internal quotations omitted).  Cf. Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of 
the Criminal Law: Toward a “Regulatory Model” of, or “Pathological Perspective” on, the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 211 (1996) (noting the danger of the 
government attempting to circumvent procedural safeguards of the criminal process by 
“rechristen[ing] . . . crimes as ‘administrative violations’”). 
31  Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1963)) (noting 
how these seven factors “migrated into our ex post facto case law from double jeopardy jurisprudence, 
[and] have their earlier origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of 
Attainder and the Ex Post Facto Clauses”). 
32  Id. 
33  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963); see also Margo Schlanger, 
The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 387 (2018) 
(describing Mendoza-Martinez as “the leading case explaining how judges should decide whether a 
particular statutory consequence imposed on someone as a result of their conduct “is penal or [, 
instead,] regulatory in character”). 
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Since the Court decided Smith, a lot has changed.  This includes changes to 
some jurisdiction’s SORAs that renders them more punitive in effect than 
previously,34 but goes far beyond SORA provisions.  There has been a steep uptick 
in the number and scope of other so-called collateral consequences of criminal 
convictions, in the form of a myriad of barriers to employment, housing, education, 
occupational licensing, and harsh consequences relating to immigration and parental 
rights, to name just some. 35  At the same time, technological advances have 
contributed to the proliferation of data collection and sale, leading to “a bustling 
economy that operates largely in the shadows, and often with few rules.”36  Many 
data aggregators deal in criminal records, allowing public access to integrated, 
nation-wide information that would have been largely inaccessible until quite 
recently. State governments also maintain criminal record databases that are 
publicly-accessible and free or cheap.37  “Further, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 
ensuing security fears increased the demand for publicly available criminal 
records.”38  These current avenues of and demand for information stand in stark 
contrast to the recent past, when it was necessary to travel to the courthouse to view 
that jurisdiction’s public criminal records.39 
The next Part describes the Supreme Court’s growing awareness of these 
shifting realities of the consequences that flow from a criminal conviction.  
                                                                                                                            
34  See, e.g., Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 701–05 (6th Cir. 2016). 
35  See LOVE, ROBERTS & LOGAN, supra note 21, at ch. 2; see also Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is 
Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 120–21 (2009) (“[C]ourts categorize many other severe consequences as 
collateral, including involuntary civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to 
vote, to obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and benefits.”). 
36  Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying and Selling 
Your Personal Information, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 2, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-your-
personal-information; see generally Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information 
Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321 (2015).  
37  See, e.g., Maryland Judiciary Case Search, MD. JUDICIARY, http://casesearch.courts.state.
md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp (last visited Aug. 17, 2019) (providing "public access to the case 
records of the Maryland Judiciary").  
38  Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary, & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked?  Criminal Record Clearing 
and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9 (2017). 
39  Of course, some of these realities did not stop Justice Kennedy, albeit writing more than 
fifteen years ago, from describing public access to on-line SORA information as “more analogous to a 
visit to an official archive of criminal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to appear in 
public with some visible badge of past criminality.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2002).  
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II. HINTS OF A SHIFTING CIVIL-CRIMINAL LINE? 
 
Although the Supreme Court has leaned heavily towards “civil” designations 
when determining the nature of particular consequences,40 it has recently recognized 
current realities that may shift which consequences fall on which side of the line.  
Although not involving analyses under the Ex Post Facto Clause, these cases offer 
hints of a shifting civil-criminal line that are relevant in a variety of contexts.  Take, 
for example, Padilla v. Kentucky, a 2010 ineffective assistance of counsel case that 
declined to determine whether deportation was a “direct” or “collateral” 
consequence.  Instead, the Court stated this was “a question we need not consider in 
this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”41  Despite this statement and 
its recognition of earlier decisions that categorized immigration removal 
proceedings as “civil in nature,” the Court detailed how immigration law has become 
increasingly harsh—with far more avenues to deportation and far fewer 
opportunities for relief from deportation than in the recent past. The Court 
characterized deportation as “a particularly severe ‘penalty’” that is “intimately 
related to the criminal process.”42  All of this made it “most difficult” for the Court—
and notably “even more difficult” for noncitizen criminal defendants—to “divorce 
the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.”43 For that reason, the 
Court held that defense counsel must advise clients about the deportation 
consequences of a conviction in order to meet minimum standards of competency 
under the Sixth Amendment.44 
Seven years later, Justice Roberts wrote for a 6-2 Court in Lee v. United States 
and drew heavily on Padilla’s characterization of deportation as “sometimes the 
most important part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants 
who plead guilty to specified crimes.”45  The Court found that Lee’s conviction and 
                                                                                                                            
40  See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (holding that removal 
proceedings are civil in nature); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 
(1984) (holding that federal statute providing forfeiture mechanism for firearms “is not an additional 
penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather is a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature 
[and thus]” is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause). Cf. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448, 
(2011) (“We . . . hold that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of 
counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, 
even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year).”). 
41  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010).  
42  Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698).  
43  Id. at 365–66 (quoting INS v. Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038). 
44 Id. at 374.  
45  Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364) 
(emphasis added).  For a description of another groups of cases where the Court has attempted to 
straddle the civil-criminal divide, see Steiker, supra note 15, at 798–99 (discussing civil forfeiture and 
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sentence should have been vacated because Lee showed that avoiding deportation 
was his main priority and thus proved that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure 
to advise him that his guilty plea would lead to automatic deportation.46  The 
decision acknowledged the importance of how a defendant experiences severe 
consequences of a conviction, separate and apart from any legislative (or judicial) 
declaration of the civil or criminal nature of that consequence. 
Or consider, in the same year as Lee, the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
invalidation of a North Carolina law that made it a felony for individuals subject to 
sex offender registration “to access a commercial social networking Web 
site . . . know[ing] that the site permits minor children to become members or to 
create or maintain personal Web pages.”47  Although a First Amendment analysis, 
Packingham v. North Carolina noted the shifting civil-criminal divide.  First, Justice 
Kennedy stated: 
 
While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a 
revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full 
dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express our-selves, 
and define who we want to be.  The forces and directions of the Internet 
are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious 
that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.48 
 
While referring to revolution in the nature of places for the exchange of views, these 
words are also relevant to the increasingly obsolete nature of the Court’s 
characterization of sex offender registration and some other consequences as civil 
and nonpunitive “in effect.” On this front, although “not an issue before the Court,” 
Packingham noted “the troubling fact that the [North Carolina] law imposes severe 
restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer 
subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system.”49 
Most recently, Justice Gorsuch concurred in Sessions v. Dimaya, a void-for-
vagueness challenge to a section of federal immigration law, and noted that: 
 
[T]oday’s civil laws regularly impose penalties far more severe than those 
found in many criminal statutes[.] Ours is a world filled with more and 
more civil laws bearing more and more extravagant punishments.  Today’s 
“civil” penalties include confiscatory rather than compensatory fines, 
                                                                                                                            
fine cases where “the Supreme Court has concluded that some state actions may be ‘punitive’ only for 
the purpose of invoking one or another procedural protection”). 
46  Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968–69. 
47  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017).  
48  Id. at 1736.  
49  Id. at 1737.  
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forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be taken, remedies that strip 
persons of their professional licenses and livelihoods, and the power to 
commit persons against their will indefinitely.  Some of these penalties are 
routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those associated with 
misdemeanor crimes—and often harsher than the punishment for 
felonies.50 
 
While the Supreme Court has only commented around the edges of the woefully 
outdated civil-criminal line, a growing number of lower federal and state courts have 
tackled the issue head-on, detailing shifting realities in declaring punitive 
consequences that might have been previously categorized as civil.  While these 
changes are well-documented,51 it is worth highlighting a few areas where courts 
have started to recognize a substantive difference in the internet age about various 
aspects of the human experience of punishment.52 
 
III. CHANGING REALITIES AT THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL LINE 
 
Even under existing doctrine governing the dividing line between laws that 
impose civil versus criminal consequences, courts should categorize more of those 
consequences as criminal given several current realities.  First, a growing body of 
empirical evidence sheds light on, and often undermines, the purportedly 
nonpunitive public safety rationale that legislatures advance (and courts use) in 
categorizing a law as civil and not criminal in intent and effect.  Second, there are 
major changes in the way people experience the various consequences related to a 
criminal conviction,53 due to the recent proliferation of these consequences 
combined with technological developments that allow easy access to criminal 
records.  For instance, public interaction with on-line information acts as a shaming 
mechanism that blurs the line between state and public imposition of punishment.  
Third, a number of consequences—such as immigration, sex offender registration, 
and loss of public, educational, and housing benefits—are now well-integrated into 
the plea bargaining and sentencing phases of the criminal process. 
 
                                                                                                                            
50  Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
51  See, e.g., LOVE, ROBERTS, AND LOGAN, supra note 21, at Ch. 4 (discussing various decisions 
finding right to counsel violations relating to a number of consequences, including immigration and 
sex offender registration, previously categorized as “collateral”); Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the 
Punitiveness of “New Generation” SORN Laws, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 426 (2018). 
52  It is certainly possible that this increased recognition of the blurred line between punishment 
and a civil regulatory scheme (or between “direct” and “collateral” consequences) could make courts 
more reluctant to find more consequences punitive or direct, as this would lead to the full array of 
criminal procedural protections for those consequences.  
53  There are, of course, a number of consequences that can result from the mere fact of an arrest, 
even without conviction.  See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–25 (2015).  
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A. Empirical Evidence About Whether Laws Advance (or Hurt) Public Safety 
 
A central and recurring theme in cases analyzing whether a particular law or 
regulation imposes punishment, and is thus criminal, is that advancing public safety 
is “a legitimate nonpunitive purpose.”54  Indeed, a “rational connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose is a most significant factor in [the] determination that the 
statute’s effects are not punitive.”55  In Smith v. Doe, for example, the Court found 
that “alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community” was a 
legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety.56  Distinguishing between a public 
safety purpose and a punitive purpose is, in itself, a complex definitional issue.57  
But putting aside that larger question, and assuming that such a distinction can be 
neatly made, what should courts do when there is no empirical evidence that the 
legislature’s purported public safety rationale for a particular scheme is, in fact, 
making the public safer? Even more to the point, what if that evidence shows that 
the scheme actually diminishes public safety? 
These are not theoretical questions.  Such empirical evidence now exists, and 
courts have taken note.  For example, in a significant recent case, Does v. Snyder, 
the Sixth Circuit held that Michigan’s SORA retroactively imposed punishment in 
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.58  While the court documented significant 
differences between the Michigan law and the federal SORNA that the Supreme 
Court examined in Smith, it also called into question Smith’s reliance on studies 
finding recidivism rates of individuals convicted of sex offenses ‘frightening and 
high.’’’59  Instead, Snyder cited a “study suggest[ing] that sex offenders (a category 
that includes a great diversity of criminals, not just pedophiles) are actually less 
likely to recidivate than other sorts of criminals.”60  This related directly to the Smith 
                                                                                                                            
54  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102–03 (2002).  
55  Id. at 102 (internal quotation and citation omitted) 
56  Id. at 103.  
57  See Murray, supra note 23, at n.16 (noting how “pursuing public safety is not exclusively a 
regulatory goal” but instead “underlies the theory of incapacitation, which is a traditional purpose for 
punishment . . . [and] might be considered a secondary effect of deterrence and rehabilitative theory”).  
Cf. John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 675–76 
(2012) (“In its early criminal-civil distinction cases, the Supreme Court seemed to assume that 
everyone knew what the purpose of punishment was, and . . . [i]n some cases, the Court focused 
on . . . whether the sanction truly furthered the non-punitive purpose it purported to serve.”). 
58  Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016).  
59  Id. at 704, (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 103). 
60  Id. (citing LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)).  For a discussion of the problematic use of recidivism rates in 
the SORA context, see Logan, supra note 51, at n.10; see also SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION (Wayne A. Logan & J.J. Prescott, eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2020).  
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Court’s finding that the “danger of recidivism . . . is consistent with the regulatory 
objective” of the SORNA.61  But the Snyder opinion did not stop there.  It flagged, 
as “[e]ven more troubling”:  
 
evidence in the record supporting a finding that offense-based registration 
has, at best, no impact on recidivism.  In fact, one statistical analysis in the 
record concluded that laws such as SORA actually increase the risk of 
recidivism, probably because they exacerbate risk factors for recidivism 
by making it hard for registrants to get and keep a job, find housing, and 
reintegrate into their communities.62 
 
Perhaps most significantly, on the issue of empirical evidence about public safety, 
Snyder noted “no evidence in the record” of “any positive effects” to counterbalance 
the statute’s “unclear” efficacy.63  Further, “Michigan has never analyzed recidivism 
rates despite having the data to do so.”64  The court also remarked that the 
requirement that registrants make “frequent, in-person appearances before law 
enforcement . . . appears to have no relationship to public safety at all.”65 
The Snyder court’s examination of the Michigan legislature’s purported 
purpose in passing and amending the SORA over the years under the harsh light of 
the lack of evidence, countering proof, and even failure to analyze existing evidence 
of public safety effects raises an interesting issue for other courts examining—and 
litigants challenging or defending—other consequences that skate close to the civil-
criminal line. What other empirical evidence exists, or could be developed, to test a 
legislature’s stated nonpunitive intent and the actual effect of the law?  
For example, federal law disqualifies any student convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance while enrolled in a higher education institution and receiving 
any grant, loan, or work assistance from receiving federal financial aid for one year 
for a first offense.66  Since the federal controlled substances schedule includes 
marijuana,67 a student convicted of possession of a small amount marijuana loses  
federal aid absent proof of rehabilitation.68  In this example, at least two pieces of 
                                                                                                                            
61  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2002). 
62  Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704–05 (citing J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex offender 
Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161 (2011)).  
63  Id. at 705. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. (emphasis added). 
66  20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2015).  
67  21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018).  
68  20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(2)(A)–(B)(2015); 34 C.F.R. § 668.40(d)(2006) (specifying requirements 
for approved drug treatment programs for proof of rehabilitation). 
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empirical evidence might help determine if the effect of the law crossed over the 
punitive line. First, there is well-developed evidence that black individuals are 
almost four times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white 
individuals, despite long-standing public health studies showing similar rates of use 
across all ages in both groups.69  Second, there is research “show[ing] that 
education . . . cuts the likelihood of returning to prison within three years by over 40 
percent”; other research connects postsecondary education to labor market 
success.70  Putting these two things together would support a claim (as part of the 
“in effect” inquiry in an ex post facto analysis, for example) that the disqualification 
law advances a punitive—not public safety—purpose and is excessive with respect 
to any nonpunitive purpose. 
In an interesting development, some jurisdictions have declined to adopt certain 
aspects of the strict standards set out in the federal SORNA in their state SORAs, 
risking the loss of ten percent of their federal criminal justice funding.71  One of the 
federal requirements is to include juveniles convicted of certain sex offenses on the 
state registry for life.72  New York State rejected this requirement, in part because 
such registration was not necessary for public safety. According to a state 
spokesperson, "New York believes that our present laws and risk assessment method 
provide our citizens with effective protection against sexual predators.”73  Indeed, 
research shows that children and teens adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses have 
particularly low recidivism rates and that registration imposes significant harm that 
includes barriers to education, employment, and housing, all of which potentially 
                                                                                                                            
69  AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE (June 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf 
70  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., BEYOND THE BOX: INCREASING ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR 
JUSTICE-INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS 1 (2016) (citing LOIS M. DAVIS ET AL., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION: A META-ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMS THAT PROVIDE EDUCATION TO 
INCARCERATED ADULTS (Rand Corp. 2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR266.html; 
ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, NICOLE SMITH & JEFF STROHL,  RECOVERY: JOB GROWTH AND EDUCATION 
REQUIREMENTS THROUGH 2020 (Geo. Pub. Pol’y Inst., Ctr. on Educ. & Workforce, 2013), 
https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Recovery2020.FR_.Web_.pdf)).    
71  34 U.S.C. § 20927(a)(2017) (setting forth 10 percent funding reduction for jurisdictions that 
fail to substantially implement Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 
(federal SORNA)); 42 U.S.C. § 3751(a) (2017) (establishing Bryne JAG program).  For details about 
various jurisdictions’ SORNA implementation status, see SORNA Implementation Status, OFF. SEX 
OFFENDER SENT’G, MONITORING, & TRACKING (last visited Aug. 22, 2019),  https://smart.gov/sorna-
map.htm. 
72  34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2017) (including juveniles convicted of certain offenses); 34 U.S.C. § 
20915 (2017) (setting out registration for the life of the offender “if the offender is a tier III sex 
offender” with some possibility for reduction of time after 25 years).  
73  Dylan Scott, States Find SORNA Non-Compliance Cheaper, GOVERNING (Nov. 7, 2011), 
https://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/States-Find-SORNA-Non-Compliance-Cheaper.html.  
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increase recidivism rates.74  Given this research, there is a strong argument that 
juvenile registration is effectively punitive.75  Since jurisdictions commonly offer 
public safety as the nonpunitive rationale for their SORA, it seems that evidence of 
harm to public safety for juvenile registration might offer the type of “clearest proof” 
necessary to demonstrate that “the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose 
or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.”76 
In the area of employment, a number of studies about the efficacy of criminal 
record-based licensing restrictions may undercut legislative claims that such 
restrictions are nonpunitive because they promote better and safer goods and 
services.  As a Department of Treasury report described,  
 
A wide range of studies have examined the question of whether licensing 
improves the quality of goods and services, as would be the case if 
licensing successfully limited the practice of an occupation to high-quality 
practitioners. . . . Overall, the empirical research does not find large 
improvements in quality or health and safety from more stringent 
licensing.  In fact, in only two out of the 12 studies was greater licensing 
associated with quality improvements.77 
 
Finally, in a recent letter introducing its report on collateral consequences, the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights stated that “[v]alid public safety bases 
support some collateral consequences, such as limitations on working with children 
for people convicted of particular dangerous crimes.  Many collateral consequences, 
however, are unrelated either to the underlying crime for which a person has been 
convicted or to a public safety purpose.”78 
                                                                                                                            
74  HUM. RTS. WATCH, RAISED ON THE REGISTRY 1 (May 2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us0513_ForUpload_1.pdf. 
75  Cf. New Jersey ex rel. C.K., (A-15-16) (077672) (N.J. 2018) (finding that New Jersey SORA 
subsection setting out “irrebuttable presumption that juveniles . . . are irredeemable, even when they 
no longer pose a public safety risk and are fully rehabilitated” is invalid because it “takes on a punitive 
aspect that cannot be justified by [the New Jersey] Constitution”).  
76  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). 
77  COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR POLICYMAKERS 16, 58 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf (listing 12 studies on licensing in areas including teaching, 
dentistry, and building contracting); see also Stephen Slivinski, Turning Shackles Into Bootstraps: Why 
Occupational Licensing Reform Is the Missing Piece of Criminal Justice Reform, 2016-01 CTR. STUD. 
ECON. LIBERTY ARIZ. ST. U. 2 (2016) (“This study estimates that between 1997 and 2007 the states with 
the heaviest occupational licensing burdens saw an average increase in the three-year, new-crime 
recidivism rate of over 9%.”).  
78  U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF 
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES, Letter of Transmittal (2019).   
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Increasing concern about the effects of so-called collateral consequences of a 
criminal record has driven increasing research in a variety of areas, including those 
of registration, employment, and licensing discussed above.  Whatever the ultimate 
conclusion is with respect to a particular consequence, research has exposed the 
fallacy of a number of claims that rely on a public safety rationale.  With this 
growing body of research, courts should apply increasing scrutiny to the purported 
nonpunitive rationale of consequences based on a criminal conviction. 
 
B. The Experience of, and Public Involvement in, Punishment  
 
Technology has changed a lot of things about the criminal legal system.79  As 
described above, ease of access to criminal records—combined with an 
unprecedented rise in laws, regulations, and policies mandating or allowing use of 
those records in decision-making processes—is a major consideration at the 
increasingly blurred line between civil and criminal consequences.80  These changes 
mean that individuals with criminal convictions experience more consequences than 
ever before, despite believing their case is finished once they complete any jail or 
prison time, probation, or other condition that the judge imposed at sentencing. In 
short, the way individuals experience punishment is different, and harsher.  
Technology has also led to more public involvement in inflicting consequences of a 
conviction, in what appears to be a return to practices of public shaming that have 
deep historical roots in punishment.81 
Recall that in Packingham, the Supreme Court found it “troubling” that North 
Carolina’s law restricting internet use “imposes severe restrictions on persons who 
already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of 
the criminal justice system.”82  One federal district court judge found Packingham’s 
“observation [about severe restrictions] significant” in its evaluation of Colorado’s 
SORA.83  While Millard v. Rankin is currently on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the 
trial court made several interesting observations in finding that Colorado’s SORA 
as applied to the three plaintiffs violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause as well as substantive due process protections.84  First, 
threaded throughout the opinion is recognition—informed by testimony at hearings 
                                                                                                                            
79  Perhaps the most prominent (and critiqued) example is how many jurisdictions now use 
algorithms to help with bail determinations and other assessments of risk.  For an excellent recent 
article examining such assessments, see Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 
(2019). 
80  See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
81  Smith, 538 U.S. at 97–99. 
82  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
83  Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1228 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal filed.  
84  Id. at 1232.  
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in the case—of the realities of the actual experience of sex offender registration, and 
particularly notification, in the data age.  For example, Millard noted how “Justice 
Kennedy’s words [in Smith] ring hollow that the state’s website does not provide the 
public with means to shame the offender when considering the evidence in this 
case.”  What Smith “did not foresee, [was] the development of private, commercial 
websites exploiting the information made available to them. . . . The justices did not 
foresee the ubiquitous influence of social media.”85  Millard devoted significant 
attention to the public shaming aspects of Colorado’s SORA, describing them as 
different in kind from 2003 when the Supreme Court considered shaming in Smith 
and weighing them heavily on the scale of punitive effect.86  Second, Millard 
detailed how “the plaintiffs have shown . . . [that] the public has been given, 
commonly exercises, and has exercised against these plaintiffs the power to inflict 
punishments beyond those imposed through the courts.”87   
Smith v. Doe reveals how the Supreme Court views the line between shaming 
and (nonpunitive) non-shaming consequences to be one of quantity as well as 
quality.  For example, the Court noted how Alaska’s SORA “Web site does not 
provide the public with means to shame the offender by, say, posting comments 
underneath his record.”88  Also noteworthy was that “[t]he Court of Appeals 
identified only one incident from the 7-year history of Alaska’s law where a sex 
offender suffered community hostility and damage to his business after the 
information he submitted to the registry became public.”89  These findings stand in 
stark contrast to the situation in Millard, some fourteen years later, under an 
admittedly more expansive Colorado statute. Here, the court described non-party 
witness testimony that “established that registered sex offenders and their families 
and friends face a known, real, and serious threat of retaliation, violence, ostracism, 
shaming, and other unfair and irrational treatment from the public, directly resulting 
from their status as registered sex offenders, and regardless of any threat to public 
safety.”90 
Millard also introduced an interesting perspective relating to this shaming: “As 
shown by the experience of these plaintiffs and the experience of others who have 
testified, the effect of publication of the information required to be provided by 
registration is to expose the registrants to punishments inflicted not by the state but 
by their fellow citizens.”91  Other courts, including Smith, have “acknowledged that 
                                                                                                                            
85  Id. at 1226. 
86  Id.  
87  Id. at 1235. 
88  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2002). 
89  Id. at 100. 
90  Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1222–23.  
91  Id. at 1226 (emphasis added).    
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[on-line] notice of a criminal conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the 
humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent of the publicity,” but characterized 
this as “attendant humiliation [that] is but a collateral consequences of a valid 
regulation” that has public safety as its true purpose and effect.92  
In Smith, Justice Kennedy also noted that historical shaming punishment 
involved either “direct confrontation between the offender and the public” in “face-
to-face shaming” or formal expulsion from the community.93  Post-Smith courts—
including the Supreme Court in Packingham—seem to have a better understanding 
of the power of on-line dissemination of information, due to the central role it plays 
in so many aspects of everyday life and the ways in which at least some members of 
the public will make use of that information.  Even where a legislature only intended 
to supplement public safety by offering accurate information to the public,94 those 
intentions are overtaken by current knowledge about vigilantism and other direct 
confrontations of individuals on registries, or with other forms of widely-
disseminated criminal history information.  It is this current reality that should 
inform the view of courts undertaking current analyses of consequences at the civil-
criminal line. 
A number of scholars have proposed ways that courts can better account for 
individuals’ actual experiences of particular consequences, either to determine if a 
consequence is punitive or for some other doctrinal purpose.  For example, David 
Singleton has suggested that courts “consider public opinion regarding whether a 
sanction is punitive” in undertaking the “in effect” prong of ex post facto analyses.95  
Carol Steiker would have courts ask, in determining if a particular state action is 
punishment and thus subject to procedural protections: “what is the effect of the 
state’s action on the individual?” and “what would the community understand the 
state’s action to mean?”96  In a critique of the restrictive scope of protections for 
prisoners under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment and Due Process Clauses, Margo Schlanger “argue[s] that constitutional 
doctrine should . . . center on the objective experience of incarcerated prisoners, 
rather than the culpability of their keepers.”97 
                                                                                                                            
92  Smith, 538 U.S. at 99. 
93  Id. at 98 (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factor that asks whether “the regulatory 
scheme . . . has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment”). 
94  See, e.g., id.  at 94 (describing how the Alaska legislature determined that “release of certain 
information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general public will assist in protecting the 
public safety”). 
95  Singleton, supra note 25, at 439; see also id.  at 465–72 (describing study on public opinion 
and punishment). 
96  Steiker, supra note 15, at 811. 
97  Schlanger, supra note 33, at 631.  
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Current SORAs may offer the strongest case for reconsideration of prior 
nonpunitive characterizations.  The shaming aspects of SORAs set them apart from 
many other consequences.  Still, attention to how an individual experiences the 
various consequences related to a criminal case are not unique to SORAs.  
Mandatory barriers in occupational licensing can cause a person to lose their chosen 
field of work.  Mandatory deportation tears individuals from the only family and 
country they know.  Losing financial aid can end a person’s educational experience, 
with profound effects on future employment and financial prospects.  Individuals 
will often experience these consequences as punitive—often as more punitive than 
any sentence imposed in the criminal case98—even if courts have not characterized 
them as such.  
 
C. The Integration of “Collateral” Consequences into the Plea Bargaining and 
Sentencing Phases of the Criminal Process 
 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that defense 
attorneys have a Sixth Amendment duty to advise noncitizen criminal defendants 
about the deportation consequences of a conviction.99  A spate of trainings and 
changes to office policies and practices followed this significant constitutional 
pronouncement.100  As defense and prosecution knowledge of immigration 
consequences developed, plea bargaining to avoid harsh immigration consequences 
became more common.101 
The Supreme Court has “long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain 
is a critical phase of litigation demanding the effective assistance of counsel”102 and 
more recently that counsel who chooses to plea bargain must be effective in that 
                                                                                                                            
98  See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2017) (“Balanced against holding on 
to some chance of avoiding deportation was a year or two more of prison time.  Not everyone in Lee's 
position would make the choice to reject the plea.  But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.”).  
99  See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text (discussing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 
(2010)). 
100 See Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1445, 1470 (2016). 
101 Press Release, Off. of the St. Atty. for Baltimore City, States Attorney Marilyn Mosby 
Instructs Her Office to Strongly Consider Prosecutorial Discretion for Cases Involving Immigrant 
Defendants, Witnesses, and Victims (May 4, 2017), available at: http://tinyurl.com/yanatg4b. Some 
offices and individual lawyers already integrated advisement about and advocacy around immigration, 
as well as other “collateral” consequences, into their practice.  However, this was concentrated in 
certain jurisdictions and certainly became more widespread in the wake of Padilla.  
102 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). 
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process.103  While the Court has not considered whether bargaining to avoid serious 
collateral consequences is required under the Sixth Amendment, some state and 
lower federal courts have found such a duty.104  Further, the integration of collateral 
consequences into plea bargaining is consistent with constitutional, ethical, and 
professional standards. For example, professional standards recommend that defense 
counsel bargain about collateral consequences that are significant to a client's 
interests, since plea discussions may be a criminal defendant's first and only 
opportunity to avoid these consequences.105 
There has also been significant movement toward integration of collateral 
consequences at sentencing.  Both the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice 
Standards and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act would grant 
courts the authority to relieve or dispense with applicable collateral consequences at 
sentencing.106  The recently-approved update to the Model Penal Code’s Sentencing 
provisions has a new Article devoted to collateral consequences.107  With increased 
attorney awareness of immigration and other serious consequences of convictions 
comes increased advocacy around those consequences at sentencing. 
The Court in Padilla based its decision, in part, on how “deportation 
is . . . intimately related to the criminal process” and “[o]ur law has enmeshed 
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation.”108  The holding in the case led 
to further enmeshment, in the form of mandated advisement about deportation prior 
to a guilty plea and plea bargaining and sentencing that accounts for deportation.  A 
variety of other serious “collateral” consequences—including sex offender 
                                                                                                                            
103 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (“During plea negotiations defendants are 
‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.’”) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 (1970)). 
104 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marinho, 981 N.E.2d 648 (Mass. 2013) (relying on state 
constitutional grounds but citing Padilla, Frye, and Lafler in holding that counsel violated the first 
prong of Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel test when counsel failed to bargain for a 
disposition that would avoid deportation consequences of a conviction). 
105 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function, 
Standard 4-1.3 (4th ed. 2015) (“[A]t all stages of a criminal representation and on all decisions and 
actions that arise in the course of performing the defense function,” defense counsel has “a duty to 
consider the collateral consequences of decisions and actions, including but not limited to the collateral 
consequences of conviction”). 
106 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification 
of Convicted Persons, Standard 19-2.5 (3d ed. 2004) (a sentencing judge should be authorized “to enter 
an order waiving, modifying, or granting timely and effective relief from any collateral sanction 
imposed by the law of that jurisdiction”); Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act § 10 
(2010) (providing for sentencing court to issue an “Order of Limited Relief” from “one or more 
collateral sanctions related to employment, education, housing, public benefits, or occupational 
licensing . . . at or before sentencing”). 
107 Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, 2017).  
108 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. 
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registration, loss of pension benefits, occupational licensing, and housing and 
employment consequences—have become similarly well-integrated into the 
criminal process (even if not by constitutional mandate).  This significant 




In the end, Gundy v. United States was a disappointment for those looking for 
radical reconfiguration of the administrative state or even for a narrow decision 
finding SORNA’s broad delegation to the Attorney General crossed established 
nondelegation doctrinal lines.  But the Court is likely to revisit nondelegation and in 
doing so might follow Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion, from his time as a judge on the 
Tenth Circuit, of a criminal law nondelegation test.  If that happens, difficult 
determinations of what qualifies as “criminal” will surely follow.  This term paper 
took off from that point, leaving Gundy and nondelegation behind to consider issues 
at the muddled line between civil and criminal, or punitive and nonpunitive, 
consequences. 
The Supreme Court has leaned heavily towards nonpunitive designations for 
sanctions in a variety of contexts.  However, changing realities have already led to 
some different outcomes in the lower federal and state courts.  These changes 
include new and developing empirical evidence about the actual effects of various 
laws and regulations, whatever their legislatively-declared purpose.  They also 
include a proliferation of so-called collateral consequences of criminal convictions 
at a time when technological advances have allowed broad and easy access to 
information about those convictions.  Consequences previously categorized as 
“civil” or “collateral” have also become integrated into the criminal process, mainly 
at the plea bargaining and sentencing stages.  Should the Court consider a criminal 
nondelegation doctrine in a future case, threshold determinations of what qualifies 
as “criminal” will be necessary.  These new developments since the Court last 
considered the civil-criminal line may, in the end, shift that line.  
